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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY, CONSTRUCTION, AND EFFECT, OF
HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION LAWS.
THu first question for our consideration is, Are the Homestead
and Exemption Laws of the Southern States unconstitutional ?
Do they impair the obligation of contracts ?
The Constitution of the United States declares that "no state
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
"In discussing this question," says Chief Justice MARSHALL,
our first inquiry is, into the meaning of words in common sense.
What is the obligation of a contract ? and what will impair it ? *
* * A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to
do, or not to do, a particular thing. The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his
contract. * * * Any law which releases a part of this obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word impair it. Much more
must a law impair it, which makes it totally invalid and entirely
discharges it :" Sturge8 v. Urowninsmeld, 4 Wheat. 197.
What does the term "obligation" in this clause, include? The
importance of the question rests mainly on the distinction which
has been drawn between the laws of a state which were in force
at the time when the contract was made, and those which are
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subsequently enacted. The latter may certainly impair this
" obligation," while the former, as it is contended, certainly cannot, because all existing laws enter into contracts made under
them and define and determine that contract. Those who hold to
the distinction maintain, that the " obligation" of the contract
consists in the municipal law existing at the time the contract is
made, 4 Wheat. 122, Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 250, 259, 302,
318, or perhaps in a combination of the moral, natural, and municipal law, 12 Wheat. 281, while those who deny the distinction,
insist that the "obligation" consists in the universal law of contracts, which is unaffected by municipal law, and is not itself conferred or created by positive law, but derived from the agreement
of the parties: Pars. on Cont., vol 3,p. 555.
"The obligation of a contract is a legal, not a mere moral obligation; it is the law which binds a party to perform his undertaking. The obligation does not inhere or subsist in the contract
itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the contract :"
1 Bouv. Law Dic. 652, and authorities cited.
When parties enter into a contract, which the plaintiff seeks to
enforce, what is the legal obligation of the defendant? His legal
obligation is to perform his contract, as the law of the land,
applicable to that contract, requires him to perform it, at the time
it was made. That is the extent of his legal obligation to the
plaintiff, and just to that extent the plaintiff has the legal right to
have it performed, in order to maintain the integrity of the legal
obligation of the defendant's contract. If there had been no existing law applicable to the contract, prescribed by the supreme
power of the state, at the time it was made, creating and defining
the defendant's obligation to perform it, then he would have
incurred no other than a mere moral obligation, over which human
tribunals have no jurisdiction. It, therefore, necessarily follows,
that the existing law applicable to the contract, prescribed by the
supreme power of the state, at the time the contract was made,
creates and defines the defendant's legal obligation to perform it,
in accordance with its terms and stipulations. "A perfect right
is that which is accompanied by the right of compelling those
who refuse to fulfil the correspondent obligation. A perfect obligation is that which gives to the opposite party the right of compulsion :" Vattel 62. The defendant's obligation to perform his
contract, under the then existing law, was perfect, and the plain-
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tiff's right to have that obligation performed as prescribed by that
existing law, was also a perfect right: Aycock v. Martin, 87 Ga.
128"
What is the rule as declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in two of the latest decisions made by that court, upon
a careful review of all the prior adjudications made by that tribunal, in regard to what constitutes the obligation of a contract ?
In the case of Mcfracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612, the court
says: "The obligation of a contract consists in its binding force
on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it was made; these are necessarily referred to in all
contracts, and forming a part of them, as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired
by the other, hence any law, which'in its operation amounts to a
denial, or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though
professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the
prohibition of the Constitution." Again the court says: "The
obligation of the contract between the parties in this case, was to
perform the promises and undertakings contained therein; the
right of the plaintiff was to damages for the breach thereof, to
bring suit and obtain a judgment, to take out and prosecute an
execution against the defendant till the judgment was satisfied,
pursuant to the existing laws of Illinois. These laws, giving these
rights, were as perfectly binding on the defendant, and as much
a part of the contract, as if they had been set forth in its stipulations in the very words of the law relating to judgments and
executions."
In the case of Van Hfoffman v. The City of Quincy, 4 Wallace 550, decided in 1866, the court, after reviewing and commenting upon the previous adjudications made upon this question
in the Supreme Court of the United States, says: "It is also
settled, that the laws which subsist at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into,
and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to, or
incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike those
which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcempent." Speaking of the distinction between the obligation of the
contract and the remedy, the court says : "-The doctrines upon
that subject, by the latest adjudications of this court, render the
distinction one rather of form than substance. A right without
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a remedy is as if it were not. For every beneficial purpose, it
may be said not to exist. A different result would leave nothing
of the contract but an abstract right of no practical value, and
render the protection of the Constitution a shadow and a delusion.
Nothing can be more material to the obligation of a contract than
the means of enforcement. Without the remedy, the contract
may, indeed, in the sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its
obligation to fall within the class of those social duties which de:
pend, for their fulfilment, wholly upon the will of the individual.
The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are
parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution
against invasion :" Van Hoffman v. The City of Quincy, 4 Wall.
554. In Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, the Supreme Court of
the United States, thus states the rule in regard to laws impairing the obligation of contracts: "The objection to a law on
the ground of its impgiring the obligation of a contract can
never depend upon the extent bf the change which the law effects
in it. Any deviation from its terms, by postponing, or accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with the
performance of those which are, however minute, or apparently
immaterial in their effect upon the contract of the parties, impairs
its obligation." See also The Justices of liorgan Co. v. Sparks
et. al., 6 Ga. 439 ; Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 195.
In 1843 in the case of Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 816, 817,
Chief Justice TANEY (concurred with by the whole court, except
Justice McLEAN), says: "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy,

may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the
alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if
that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either
case it is prohibited by the Constitution. * * * It is difficult,
perhaps, to draw a line that would be applicable in all cases, between legitimate alterations of the remedy, and provisions which,
in form of remedy, impair the right. But it is manifest that the
obligation of the contract and the right of the party under it,
may, in effect, be destroyed by denying a remedy altogether, or
may be seriously impaired by burdening the proceedings with new
conditions and restrictions, so as to make the remedy hardly
worth pursuing. And no one, we presume, would say there was
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any substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring a
particular contract or class of contracts to be abrogated and void,
and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered it with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable
to pursue it."
In 1844, in the case of MeCracken v. H~ayward, 2 Howard 611,
this decision was reviewed and confirmed, Justice BALDWIN delivering the opinion of the court. And in 1866, in the case of
Van .offman v. The City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 554, the whole
court, after thoroughly reviewing all the previous decisions delivered by said cofirt, and affirming them, says: "If these doctrines were res integrc8 the consistency and soundness of the
reasoning which maintains-a distinction between the contract and
the remedy-or, to speak more accurately, between the remedy
and the other parts of the contract-might perhaps well be
doubted. But they rest in this court upon a foundation of
authority too firm to be shaken; and they are supported by such
an array of judicial names that it is hard for the mind not to feel
constrained to believe they are correct. The doctrines upon the
subject established by the latest adjudications of this court render the distinction one rather of form than substance."
From a careful review of every case before the court, since the
case of Bronson v. .inzie, involving the interpretation of the
clause of the Constitution which we have been considering, it
will be observed that they all conform to the opinion of Chief
Justice TANEY.
Mr. Sedgwick, in his recent Commentary on Statutory and
Constitutional Law 652, 653, after citing and reviewing all the
cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, wherein this
prohibition of the Constitution is drawn in question, says: "I am
free to confess my entire inability to distinguish between the obligation and the remedy of a contract. Obligation, I suppose,
means binding force, the force or constraint which binds the party
to perform his agreement. What, then, is in legal acceptation,
the binding force of a contract? It certainly is not the mere
naked promise. It is not the moral duty. It is not honor, or
fashion, that binds the contracting party to keep his engagement.
What is it then but the remedy-the coercive remedy-which the
law gives against the person or property of the defaulting party ?
It seems to me, that looking at a contract legally and practically
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as an instrument by which rights of property are created, and in
which they repose, obligation and remedy are strictly convertible
terms. Take away the whole remedy and it is admitted the contract is gone. How, then, if a material part of the remedy be
taken away, can it be said that the obligation is not impaired-?
A confusion would seem to have arisen from not sufficiently taking into consideration the full sense of the term impaired. It is
said that the remedy forms no part of the contract, and that the
creditor makes his bargain, knowing that he is at the mercy of
future legislation; but as I understand it, all the cases distinguishing between the operation of state insolvent laws and state stop
laws, passed before the making of the contract, and those made
after, proceed on the very ground that the legislation in force at
the time of the contract enters into and forms part of it. It is
said again, that in all countries, and at all times, the remedy has
been under the control of the sovereign authority. This is merely
begging the question, or rather arguing from false analogies. The
very question with us, is whether, under our system, we have not
declared a different rule. No one seeks to deny that the remedy
should be to a certain extent under legislative control. Tribunals
may be changed, procedure altered; these modifications do in no
wise impair the remedy or prejudice the holder of a contract.
But it seems to me the only logical rule to hold, that any legislation which materially diminishes the remedy given by law to the
creditor at the time his contract is made, just so far impairs the
obligation of the contract." I
From these decisions we can safely state the following principles of law:I. That the obligation of a contract is a legal not a mere moral
obligation; it is the law which exists at the time the contract is
made, which binds a party to perform his undertaking. That the
obligation does not inhere in the contract itself proprio vigore,
but in the law applicable to the contract; and that the idea of validity and remedy are inseparable and both are part of the obligation which is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States against invasion.
IThe decision in the case of Van Hoffinan v. The Cityj of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535,
was not rendered at the time fr. Sedgwick wrote his Commentary, but the conclusion which he arrives at, is fully sustained by the Supreme Court in that
decision.
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II. That any law passed after the making of a contract which
impairs the obligation of said contract, whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract, is a law impairing
the obligatioii of contracts, in the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States, which declares that " no State shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts."
III. That the Supreme Court of the United States being the
recognised interpreter of the Federal Constitution, its decisions,
upon the question under consideration, are binding authority upon
all the State Courts.
Let us now review some of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of
the Southern States, delivered upon their Homestead and Exemption Laws, and see if they have recognised the binding authority
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the case of Hardeman v. Donner, 89 Ga. 425 (WARNER, J.,
dissenting; see also Pullianv. Sewell, to appear in 40 Ga. Repts.),
decided June Term 1869, the Supreme Court of Georgia held
"1that the homestead and exemption laws were retroactive and applied to judgments, executions and decrees founded on debts contracted before that time." The facts of the case were these: James
Donner applied to the Ordinary for exemption of personalty worth
$1000 and of his homestead under the Constitution of 1868. 980
acres of land certified by the surveyor to be worth not more than
$2000 in gold, and his personalty, were allowed him by the Ordinary. Before the allowance was made Hardeman filed his
objections to it upon the ground that he had a judgment against
Donner which was obtained before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 ; that execution had been issued and levied on said
land before Donner filed his application, and that Donner had not
sufficient property besides said land to satisfy said judgment. The
case was taken to the Superior Court on appeal, and the judgment
of the Ordinary affirmed. The refusal to dismiss Donner's application was assigned as error and taken to the Supreme Court where
the judgment of the court below was affirmed and the homestead
and exemption approved and allowed, the court deciding that the
homestead and exemption laws of 1868 were retroactive but that
they did not fall within the prohibition of the Constitution of the
United States (Art. 10, sec. 1): and that a judgment was a lien
created by law and not by the contract of the parties, and that the
Constitution of the United States only prohibited a state from
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divesting a vested right created by the contract of parties. Is
not this decision in direct conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States? Does it not release Donner's
property from the payment of Hardeman's judgment, which was
obtained before the Act was passed under which Donner seeks his
homestead ?
"The release," says Chief Justice MARSHALL, " of a man's
effects and property from the payment of what he stipulated,
would be a violation of the obligation of the contract; the law
subjects the property at all times to pay the debt, and the withdrawal of it from that purpose, is a clear violation of the obligation of the contract. The property constitutes the means, the
sole means, of satisfying his debts; take that away and a mere
naked promise is left the creditor, and the obligation is gone."
"One of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its
value has, by legislation, been diminished. It is not by the Constitution to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree
or cause, but of encroaching, in any respect, on its obligationdispensing with any part of its force:" Van Hoffman v. The City
of Quincy, 4 Wall. 553. Would any man give as much for Hardeman's judgment against Donner, and the defendant's obligation
to perform it, now since the passage of the Act of 1868, allowing
the defendant to exempt $2000 worth of realty and $1000 of personalty when the law allows him, as in the case before us, the privilege of exempting all of his property? If not, why not? Is it not
because the contract has been diminished by the law encroaching
on its obligation-dispensing with a part of its force ? Will it be
answered that the state has the power over the remedy, and that
the remedy only is altered? We reply in the words of Chief
Justice TANEY: "Whatever belongs merely to the remedy, may
be altered according to the wilr of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that
effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on
the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is
prohibited by the Constitution :" Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard
316; see also Sturges v. Crowninsiield,4 Wheat. 191; Green v.
Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; JMcCrackeen v. Hayward, 2 Howard 608;
Howard v. Bugbee, 24 Id. 461.
In Chambliss v. Phelvs, 89 Ga. 386 (WARNER, J., dissenting),
the Court decided, "that the homestead was not subject to an ex-
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ecution -which was issued upon a judgment to foreclose a mortgage before the adoption of th'e Constitution." The facts of the
case were these: Chambliss applied to the Court for the exemption
from his debts of certain personalty and certain land as his
homestead. The county surveyor laid off certain 501 acres of
land as said homestead, and certified that they were not worth
over $2000 in specie. Phelps objected to the court approving
said exemption, because he ,wasthe owner of a mortgage for
$20,00 made by said Chambliss on said-land to said Phelps on the
8th of November, 1858. The rule absolute foreclosing said mortgage was taken in August 1867. The exemption laws were not
passed until 1868.
This ecision is in direct opposition to several "decisions pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States. The first
decision was Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard 311; affirmed by
Sc acken v. Hayward, '2 Id. 612; Grantley v. Bwing, 3
Id., 716; Howard v. -jugbee,
24 Id. 461; in which the
court says: "A mortgage contained a power to the creditor to
sell on preach of the condition, and thereby pay the debt; this
power was valid under the laws 6f the state When given. A law
subsequently passed, giving to the mortgagor twelve months to
redeem the property from the purchaser at such sale, and prohibiting if from being ,ade for less than two-thirds of its appraised
value, so altered the remedy of the creditor, as to impair the
obligation of the contract." The Supreme 06urt of the United
States held that a subsequent statute which gave the mortgagor
a right to redeem his property from the purchaser within twelve
months, and whIch prohibited the property from being sold for
less than two-thirds of its appraised value, impaired the obligation
of the original mortgage contract; and yet the Supreme Court of
Georgia, with all these decisions before it, decides that a subsequent statute, which takes away from the mortgagor the right to
foreclose his mortgage and issue execution and levy on the land
mortgaged, does hot impair the obligation of the original mortgage contract.
-Again : In the case of Kelly v. Stephens, 39 Ga. 466, the court
held, "that where one Harrison had a judgment against Kelly in
1859, and was about to levy on and sell the land now in contro-

troversy, and Kely apped to Thomas who loaned Jim the money
to relieve the land from sale, and took his note secured by mortVoL. XIX.-Io
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gage in May 1859, upon which a mortgage fi. fa. issued in 1867,
the lien of which it is now souglit to enforce by the sale of the
land, and Kelly claims a homestead in the land as against the
mortgage lien, Kelly is not entitled to the homestead in the land,
because as to past contracts the plaintiff's mortgage created an
encumbrance upon the land which the defendant is bound to discharge, before he is entitled to a homestead under the Act of
1868."
Judge WARNER in his dissenting opinion in 6*hambliss v. Phelps,
supra, says: "Perhaps it is owing to the want of proper discrimination, but I have not been able to discover any difference in
principle between the encumbrance created upon the homestead
of Chambliss by Phelps's mortgage, and that created on the homestead of Kelly by Thomas's mortgage. Both were executed prior
to the passage of the homestead Act, and both were encumbrances
upon the land claimed as a homestead."
The distinction made in these two cases is as absurd as it is
unjust and illegal. If A lends B money and takes a mortgage on
B's land, before the Homestead Act of 1868, B can apply under
said Act for a homestead and it is not subject to A's mortgage.
But if A lends money to B and takes a mortgage on B's land,
before the Homestead Act of 1868, and B should borrow from C
money to pay off A's mortgage, and should then execute to C a
mortgage on said land, C's mortgage would have to be first satisfied
before B could obtain a homestead out of said land. In the first
instance the mortgage is not an encumbrance upon the land. A
has no vested right-no lien, because the judges have decided the
Homestead and Exemption Laws "to be retroactive, and constitutional as the remedy only is altered." Whereas in the second
case C has a lien, a vested right-because his mortgage comes
within the exception as provided for under the Act of 1868riz. : "removing of encumbrances."
In North Carolina the Supreme Court has rendered several
decisions upon the recent Homestead and Exemption Laws in
force in that state, all of which are referred to in this article:
Ante, page 12. They have to a great extent recognised the binding authority of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
In the case of MfcKeithan v. Terry, 64 N. C. p. 25, afterwards
affirmed in the case of Sluder v. Rogers, Ibid. p. 289, the Court
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says: "Specific liens created before the adoption of the Constitution are not divested by the provisions for a homestead in the
Constitution." This decision receives and recognises the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
But in the case of Hill v. Kessler, 63 N. C. 427, the court
held "that the Homestead and Exemption Laws apply to debtsmere indebtedness-existing before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868; debts not being a lien-a vested right-upon the
property of the debtor." Like the Supreme Court of Georgia
and of Mississippi, it decides that although the homestead and
exemption laws are retroactive, they do not come within the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States, which declares
that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts."
From this decision in Hill v. Kessler, supra, it would seem, in
order to sustain the court, that the clause of the Constitution
should be read thus: "no state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of those contracts which have become liens-vested
rights." But the words of the Constitution are "no state shall
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." "It would
seem difficult to substitute words," says Chief Justice MARSHALL,
" which are more intelligible, or less liable to misconstruction;
they are express, and incapable of being misunderstood:" Sturges
v. Cjowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Is not a "debt-mere indebtedness"-a contract? and does not a law which diminishes its
value impair it? When the defendant contracted the debt was
he not under the obligation to pay it? Did not his "property
constitute the means, the whole means of satisfying his debt? If
that is taken away, and a mere naked promise is left the creditor,
is not the obligation gone ?" Is not the binding force of the law
which was in existence when the debt was contracted-and which
is the obligation of the contract, taken away and totally impaired ?
Is it not, to say the least, encroaching on its obligation-dispensing with a part of its force? If the Supreme Court in Sturges v.
Crowninshield,4 Wheat. 122, decided that it is unconstitutional
for a state to pass a law, discharging the debtor from all liability
for any debt contracted previous to his discharge, on his surrendering his property for the benefit of his creditors, on the ground
that it is a law "impairing the obligation of a contract," within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, would it
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not also decide, and has it not already decided, that it is unconstitutional for a state to pass a law declaring that a debtor may
have his property exempted for his own benefit, and that it shall
not be subject to. any previous debts: 4 Wheat. 122; McCracken
v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213;
Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 84; Planters' Bank v. Sharp et.
al., 6 How. 327; FVan Hoffman v. Mity of Quincy, 4 Wall. 548.
In the language of Mr. Justice STORY: "It is perfectly clear
that any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes
the intention of the parties resulting from the stipulations in the
contract necessarily impairs it. The manner or degree in which
the change is effected, can in no respect influence the conclusion;
for whether the law affect the validity, the construction, the duration, the discharge, or the evidence of the contract, it impairs its
obligation, though it may not do so to the same extent in all supposed cases :" 3d vol. of Commentaries, p. 250; Golden v. Prince,
3 Wash. C. C. R. 309. "No agreement or contract can create
a more binding obligation than those fastened by the law-which
the law creates and attaches to contracts. * * * Any subsequent
law which denies, obstructs or impairs these rights by superadding conditions," as that property shall not be subject to levy and
sale for pre-existing debts-" is a denial of right." 11The same
power in a state legislature may be carried to any extent if it
exist at all ;" it may prohibit any of a debtor's property being
sold, which is the effect in most cases under the present Homestead
and Exemption Laws of the South-" if it can be exercised at
all, it must be a matter of uncontrolled discretion in passing laws
relating to the remedy, which are regardless of the effect on the
rights of plaintiffs :" McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612. And
if the rights of plaintiffs are affected, " it is immaterial whether it
is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself.
In either case it is prohibited by the Constitution :" Bronson v.
Kinzie, 1 How. 316.
The great principle which was intended to be established, by
the prohibition of the Constitution, "that no state shall pass any
ltaw impairing the obligation of contracts," v as the inviolability
of contracts. No particular subjects are enumerated to which it
should apply. It was intended to forbid all laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. In Ogden v. Saunders, supra, Chief
Justice MARSHALL says: "The

power of changing the relative
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situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a
power which comes home to every man, touches the interest of all,
and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which
he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had
been used to such excess by the state legislatures as to break in
upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The mischief had become so great,
so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse andthreaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people and destroy the sanctity of private faith. The object of the
Convention, therefore, was by this article to impose restraints on
state legislation as respected contracts, and to prohibit the use of
any means by which their inviolability might be assailed."
But the very object of the Constitution has been evaded, disregarded and violated. The legislatures of most of the Southern
States have exercised uncontrollable discretion in passing Homestead and Exemption Laws (which they claim relate only to the
remedy), regardless of the effect on the rights of plaintiffs. It is contended that a great necessity existed, growing out of the war, which
justified and sanctioned the violation of these great fundamental
principles of government and constitutional law. But those who
make this assertion should remember that creditors as well as
debtors suffered from the calamities of war. The rights of the
former are entirely lost sight of in the general demoralization of
society resulting from the evils of war, and in most of the Southern States the homesteads and exemptions are so exorbitant and
extravagant,' that there are but few cases in which any property
IArkansas:

Homestead worth $5000-Personalty $2000-Total $7000.
Worth Carolina: do. do.
1000
do.
500 do.
1500.
South Catolina: do. do.
1000
do.
500 do.
1500.
Tennessee:
do. do.V 1000
do.
250
do.
1250.
Georgia :*
do. do.
2000
do.
1000
do.
3000.
Florida:
do. 160 acres of land. do.
1000.
Louisiana: Homestead 160 acres of land and personalty both together not to
exceed $2000.
MIississippi : Homestead 240 acres of land and personalty both together not to
exceed $4000.
* The population of Georgia is about 1,500,000. It is generally estimated that
there is a "head of a family" to every 5 persons; therefore there would be about
300,000 "heads of families" in Georgia. The land in Georgia is valued at about
$200,000,000. Each family being entitled to real estate worth $2000, it would
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of the debtor is left, out of which creditors can procure their
money. The result is that in the majority of cases dishonest
debtors take advantage of the law, secure their property from
levy and sale, which they know is justly subject to their honest
debts, and live in comparative affluence, while their creditors suffer for the necessities of life.
There is but one remedy left, and that is, at an early day to
test the constitutionality of these laws. This can be done in two
ways. Either by a citizen of the state through the state courts;
or by a non-resident in the United States courts. In the former,
a case can be taken to the Supreme Court of the state and carried from that court by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the latter, a case can be brought in the United
States Circuit Court. No one for a moment will doubt the result
of a case in that court, as it would be compelled to receive the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as binding
authority. As the law now stands in most of the Southern States,
no debts, whether simple debts or judgments, which were in existence before the passage of these laws, can be enforced-the
courts of nearly all the states asserting that these laws are constitutional and apply to debts contracted before, as well as those
contracted after their adoption. Hence the only relief for honest
creditors against dishonest debtors, who in their dishonest purpose
and intention wilfully and willingly take advantage of that law
which takes the property of one man from him and gives it to
another without his consent and denies him all remedy to enforce
his right-is to be found before the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the expounders of the Federal Constitution must and
will prohibit the use of any means by which the inviolability of
contracts might be assailed, and thereby support the Constitution
and preserve the dignity and integrity, the power and purity of
the Judiciary.
J. H. THOMAS.
Savannah, Ga.
r'equire about $600,000,000 worth of real property to give to each head of a family
in Georgia a homestead. This clearly demonstrates that there is three times more
land authorized to be exempted under the Homestead Act than is actually in the
state of Georgia.

